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In parametric analysis, which often referrers to parametric 
optimization or parametric programming, a perturbation parameter is 
introduction to the optimization problem, which means that the coefficients 
in the objective function of the problem and on the other hand of the 
constraints are perturbed. In this paper, we present the qualitative and 
quantitative analysis of adapted approach of Min-Max differential game of 
fixed duration with general parameters in the cost functions and constrains 
between multiple players playing dependently (the Pareto concept) and 
others independently (the Nash concept), the solvability set and the stability 
sets of the first and the second kind are defined and algorithms for 
determining these sets are presented.
 
Keywords: Parametric Analysis, Dynamic game, Stability set of the first 
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Introduction 
           Under the min-max (security) solution concept (Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern,1944) a parametric dynamic game study introduced between 
cooperative collation of players (Pareto,1896)  and other players act 
independently (Nash,1951) (Starr and Ho,1967,1969) where the parameters 
presented in the objective functions and constraints, qualitative and 
quantitative analysis of some basic notions, such as the set of feasible 
parameters, the solvability set and the stability sets of the first and the second 
kind, are defined and analyzed qualitatively and quantitatively for some 
classes of parametric optimization problems(M.S. Osman,1977)(M.S. 
Osman, A. El-Bauna and E. Youness,1986) The same notions are redefined 
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           Consider the differential game ( , )P γ ε with general parameters kRγ ∈  
in the objective functions and general parameters kRε ′∈ in the constraints 
between M  of players that agree to form a coalition and cooperate as a 
single player I to minimize their collective costs playing a min - max 
differential game against the other N  players outside the coalition which act 
independently to minimize their own cost.Let 
=1





u t R i M l l∈ ∑  be the composite control of the player  i  
among the coalition, while 
=1




v t R j N m m∈ ∑  be the 
composite control of the player joutside the coalition, where the composite 
control ( , ) su v R∈  is an element  
of  the constrain set  
0 0( ) = {( , ) | ( ) = ( , , , , ), ( ) = , ( , , , , ) 0}
su v R x t f t x u v x t x h t x u vε ε εΩ ∈ ≥  , 
 where 
( ) = ( , ( ), ( ), ( ), ),x t f t x t u t v t ε  
 represent the system of nonlinear differential equations that govern the game 
motion, the problem can be formulated as the following problems: 
1
=1




P J t u v w J t u vγ ε γ γ∑  
 
0
ˆ= ( ( )) ( , , , , )
t f
f t
x t I t x u v dtφ γ+ ∫  
subject to 
 
0 0ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) = {( , ) | ( ) = ( , , , , ), ( ) = , ( , , , , ) 0}








P J t u v w J t u vγ ε γ γ∑  
 *
0
= ( ( )) ( , , , , )
t f
f t
x t I t x u v dtφ γ+ ∫  
  




0 0( ) = {( , ) | ( ) = ( , , , , ), ( ) = , ( , , , , ) 0}
su v R x t f t x u v x t x h t x u vε ε εΩ ∈ ≥
where 
0
( ( ), ( ), ) = ( ( )) ( , ( ), ( ), ( ), ) , = 1,2, ,
t f
i i f it
J u t v t x t I t x t u t v t dt i Mγ φ γ+ ∫ 
are the cost functions for the M  cooperative players
=1
( ( )) = ( ( ))
M
f i i f
i
x t w x tφ φ∑  and 
=1




I t x u v w I t x u vγ γ∑  for each 
w W∈ ,
=1





W w R w w∈ ≥ ∑ , 
3 ( , )P γ ε :
0
( , , , , ) = ( ( )) ( , , , , , ) = 1,2, , .min
t f
j jj j j f j jtv j
J t u v v x t I t x u v v dt j Nγ φ γ− −+ ∫    
 subject to 
0 0ˆ( ) = {( , ) | ( ) = ( , , , , , ), ( ) = , ( , , , , , ) 0}
s
j jj ju v R x t f t x u v v x t x h t x u v vε ε ε− −Ω ∈ ≥ 
and 
4 ( , ) :P γ ε
* *
0
( , , , , ) = ( ( )) ( , , , , , ) , = 1,2, , .maxmin
t f
j j j j f j j jtv uj
J t u v v x t I t x u v v dt j Nγ φ γ− −+ ∫ 
 subject to 
* * *
0 0( ) = {( , ) | ( ) = ( , , , , , ), ( ) = , ( , , , , , ) 0}
s
j j j ju v R x t f t x u v v x t x h t x u v vε ε ε− −Ω ∈ ≥
where  
0
( , , , ) = ( ( )) ( , , , , ) , = 1,2, , .
t f
j j f jt
J t u v x t I t x u v dt j Nγ φ γ+ ∫   are the cost 
functions for the N  non-cooperative players.Here, 0[ , ]ft t  denotes the fixed 
prescribed duration of the game, 
0x : the initial state known by all players, 
( ) nx t R∈  is the state vector of the game, 
0(.) :[ , ]
n s k q
fh t t R R R R
′× × × →  
0(.) :[ , ]
n s k n
ff t t R R R R
′× × × → , = .s l m+  
0(.) :[ , ]
n s k
j fI t t R R R R× × × →  , = 1,2, , .j N  
0(.) :[ , ]
n s k
i fI t t R R R R× × × →  , = 1,2, , .i M  
(.) : nj R Rφ →  , = 1,2, , .j N  
(.) : ni R Rφ →  , = 1,2, , .i M are continuous differentiable functions. 
         In the following, we give the definition of the solvability and stability 
European Scientific Journal January 2015 edition vol.11, No.3 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
315 
sets of problems. 
 
The Solvability Set 
 Definition 1.1 The Solvability set B  of problem ( , )P γ ε  is defined as : 
{ }= ( , ) | ( , )k kB R the solution of P exist for some w Wγ ε γ ε′+∈ ∈              (1) 
 
The Stability Set of The First Kind 
           Definition 1.2  Suppose that * *( , ) Bγ ε ∈ with a corresponding set *U  
of Pareto,Nash Min-Max solutions  *( , ), ( , ), ( , )u v u v u v  and *( , )ju v of 
problems * * * * * *1 2 3( , ), ( , ), ( , )P P Pγ ε γ ε γ ε and
* *
4 ( , )P γ ε  respectively , then the 
stability set of first kind of problem ( , )P γ ε corresponding to *U denoted by
*( )S U is defined by 
{ }* *( ) = ( , ) | ( , )k kS U R U solve P for some w Wγ ε γ ε′+∈ ∈                       (2) 
         Lemma 1.3 If for each = 1,2, , .i M  and = 1,2, , .j N  the cost 
functions ( , , , )iJ t u v γ  and ( , , , )jJ t u v γ  are linear in γ  , 
( , ( ), ( ), ( ), )f t x t u t v t ε  and ( , ( ), ( ), ( ), )h t x t u t v t ε  are linear functions in ε , 
then the set *( )S U  is convex. 
Proof. Suppose that *1 1 2 2( , ), ( , ) ( )S Uγ ε γ ε ∈  , then it follows that for  
1 1 1( , )P γ ε  

1 1( , , ) ( , , )J u v J u vγ γ≤  

1( ) = ( , ( ), , , )x t f t x t u v ε  

1( , ( ), , , ) 0h t x t u v ε ≥  
2 1 1( , )P γ ε  
*
1 1( , , ) ( , , )J u v J u vγ γ≤  
* *
1 1( , , ) ( , , )J u v J u vγ γ≥  
*
1( ) = ( , ( ), , , )x t f t x t u v ε  
*
1( , ( ), , , ) 0h t x t u v ε ≥  
3 1 1( , )P γ ε  
1 1( , , , ) ( , , , )j jJ t u v J t u vγ γ≤  
1( ) = ( , ( ), , , )x t f t x t u v ε  
1( , ( ), , , ) 0h t x t u v ε ≥  
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4 1 1( , )P γ ε  
*
ˆ ˆ1 1( , , , ) ( , , , )
j j
j jJ t u v J t u vγ γ≤  
* *
1 1( , , , ) ( , , , )
j
j jJ t u v J t u vγ γ≥  
*
1( ) = ( , ( ), , , )
jx t f t x t u v ε  
*
1( , ( ), , , ) 0
jh t x t u v ε ≥  
(3) 
similarly for 
1 2 2( , )P γ ε  

2 2( , , ) ( , , )J u v J u vγ γ≤  

2( ) = ( , ( ), , , )x t f t x t u v ε  

2( , ( ), , , ) 0h t x t u v ε ≥  
2 2 2( , )P γ ε  
*
2 2( , , ) ( , , )J u v J u vγ γ≤  
* *
2 2( , , ) ( , , )J u v J u vγ γ≥  
*
2( ) = ( , ( ), , , )x t f t x t u v ε  
*
2( , ( ), , , ) 0h t x t u v ε ≥  
3 2 2( , )P γ ε  
2 2( , , , ) ( , , , )j jJ t u v J t u vγ γ≤  
2( ) = ( , ( ), , , )x t f t x t u v ε  
2( , ( ), , , ) 0h t x t u v ε ≥  
4 2 2( , )P γ ε  
*
ˆ ˆ2 2( , , , ) ( , , , )
j j
j jJ t u v J t u vγ γ≤  
* *
2 2( , , , ) ( , , , )
j
j jJ t u v J t u vγ γ≥  
*
2( ) = ( , ( ), , , )
jx t f t x t u v ε  
*
2( , ( ), , , ) 0
jh t x t u v ε ≥  
(4) 
now multiplying both sides of the sets of equations (3) by α  and both sides 
of the sets of equations (4)  by (1 )α−  and adding corresponding sequence of 
same problem together using the linearity property in γ  and ε ,we get 
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1P  
  1 2 1 2( , , (1 ) ) ( , , (1 ) )J u v J u vαγ α γ αγ α γ+ − ≤ + −  
  1 2( ) = ( , ( ), , , (1 ) )x t f t x t u v αε α ε+ −  
  1 2( , ( ), , , (1 ) ) 0h t x t u v αε α ε+ − ≥  
2P  
 * 1 2 1 2( , , (1 ) ) ( , , (1 ) )J u v J u vαγ α γ αγ α γ+ − ≤ + −  
 * *1 2 1 2( , , (1 ) ) ( , , (1 ) )J u v J u vαγ α γ αγ α γ+ − ≥ + −  
 * 1 2( ) = ( , ( ), , , (1 ) )x t f t x t u v αε α ε+ −  
 * 1 2( , ( ), , , (1 ) ) 0h t x t u v αε α ε+ − ≥  
3P  
 1 2 1 2( , , , (1 ) ) ( , , , (1 ) )j jJ t u v J t u vαγ α γ αγ α γ+ − ≤ + −  
 1 2( ) = ( , ( ), , , (1 ) )x t f t x t u v αε α ε+ −  
 1 2( , ( ), , , (1 ) ) 0h t x t u v αε α ε+ − ≥  
4P  
 *ˆ ˆ1 2 1 2( , , , (1 ) ) ( , , , (1 ) )
j j
j jJ t u v J t u vαγ α γ αγ α γ+ − ≤ + −  
 * *1 2 1 2( , , , (1 ) ) ( , , , (1 ) )
j
j jJ t u v J t u vαγ α γ αγ α γ+ − ≥ + −  
 * 1 2( ) = ( , ( ), , , (1 ) )
jx t f t x t u v αε α ε+ −  
 * 1 2( , ( ), , , (1 ) ) 0
jh t x t u v αε α ε+ − ≥                                    (5)  
 sets of equations (5) yields that *1 2 1 2( (1 ) , (1 ) ) ( )S Uαγ α γ αε α ε+ − + − ∈  
and hence *( )S U  is convex.  
            Lemma 1.4 If for each = 1,2, , .i M  and = 1,2, , .j N  the cost 
functions ( , , , )iJ t u v γ  and ( , , , )jJ t u v γ  are continuous on 
kR  , 
( , ( ), ( ), ( ), )f t x t u t v t ε  and ( , ( ), ( ), ( ), )h t x t u t v t ε  are continuous on kR ′  , then 
the set *( )S U  is closed.  
Proof. Let { , }n nγ ε  be a sequence in 
*( )S U  such that { , }n nγ ε  converges to 
0 0( , )γ ε  as n →∞  for all ( , ) ( )u v ε∈Ω  then for  
1( , )n nP γ ε  
( , , ) ( , , )n nJ u v J u vγ γ≤  
( ) = ( , ( ), , , )nx t f t x t u v ε  
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( , ( ), , , ) 0nh t x t u v ε ≥  
2 ( , )n nP γ ε  
*( , , ) ( , , )n nJ u v J u vγ γ≤  
* *( , , ) ( , , )n nJ u v J u vγ γ≥  
*( ) = ( , ( ), , , )nx t f t x t u v ε  
*( , ( ), , , ) 0nh t x t u v ε ≥  
3 ( , )n nP γ ε  
( , , , ) ( , , , )j n j nJ t u v J t u vγ γ≤  
( ) = ( , ( ), , , )nx t f t x t u v ε  
( , ( ), , , ) 0nh t x t u v ε ≥  
4 ( , )n nP γ ε  
*
ˆ ˆ( , , , ) ( , , , )
j j
n nj jJ t u v J t u vγ γ≤  
* *( , , , ) ( , , , )jj n j nJ t u v J t u vγ γ≥  
*( ) = ( , ( ), , , )j nx t f t x t u v ε  
*( , ( ), , , ) 0j nh t x t u v ε ≥                                                                      (6)  
           Now taking the limit of both sides of the sets of equations (6) as 
n →∞  it yields that  
1P  

0 0( , , ) ( , , )J u v J u vγ γ≤  

0( ) = ( , ( ), , , )x t f t x t u v ε  

0( , ( ), , , ) 0h t x t u v ε ≥  
2P  
*
0 0( , , ) ( , , )J u v J u vγ γ≤  
* *
0 0( , , ) ( , , )J u v J u vγ γ≥  
*
0( ) = ( , ( ), , , )x t f t x t u v ε  
*
0( , ( ), , , ) 0h t x t u v ε ≥  
3P  
0 0( , , , ) ( , , , )j jJ t u v J t u vγ γ≤  
0( ) = ( , ( ), , , )x t f t x t u v ε  
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0( , ( ), , , ) 0h t x t u v ε ≥  
4P  
*
ˆ ˆ0 0( , , , ) ( , , , )
j j
j jJ t u v J t u vγ γ≤  
* *
0 0( , , , ) ( , , , )
j
j jJ t u v J t u vγ γ≥  
*
0( ) = ( , ( ), , , )
jx t f t x t u v ε  
*
0( , ( ), , , ) 0
jh t x t u v ε ≥                                                                   (7) 
from equations (7)  we deduce that *0 0( , ) ( )S Uγ ε ∈  and 
*( )S U  is closed.  
             Theorem 1  If ( , ) su v R∈Ω⊆  is Pareto solution for the M players 
inside the coalition with state trajectory *x  corresponding to problem 
1( , )P γ ε  ,then there exist continuous costate functions 0:[ , ] nfp t t R→  , 
qRδ ∈  such that the following relations are satisfied  
 * * * 0 0( ) = ( , , , , ) , ( ) =x t f t x u v x t xε                                      (8)        
 
*
1( , , , , , , , , , , )( ) =
( )















f i i f
if
x t





∂ ∑                           (10)  
*




                                                         (11) 
*( , , , , ) = 0h t x u vδ ε                                                                                      (12) 
*( , , , , ) 0h t x u v ε ≥                                                                                         (13) 
0δ ≥                                                                                              (14) 
 where  
1
=1





H t x u v w w p w I t x u v p f t x u vδ γ ε γ ε+∑  
( , , , , )T h t x u vδ ε−                                                                                         (15)  
 is the Hamiltonian function of the players inside the coalition and its partial 
derivatives.Furthermore , If *( , ) su v P R∈ ⊆ Ω⊆  is Min-Max point for the 
M  cooperative players with state trajectory *x  corresponding to problem 
2 ( , )P γ ε  ,then there exist continuous costate functions 0:[ , ]
n
fp t t R→  , 
qRς ∈  and j qRη ∈  such that the following relations are satisfied  
 * * * * 0 0( ) = ( , , , , ) , ( ) =x t f t x u v x t xε                                  (16)  




1( , , , , , , , , , , , )( ) =
( )
j
MH t x u v w w pp t
x t
ς η γ ε∂
−
∂










f i i f
if
x t





∂ ∑                           (18)  
* *
1( , , , , , , , , , , , ) = 0
j
MH t x u v w w p
u
ς η γ ε∂
∂
                                                (19)  
* *




H t x u v w w p
v
ς η γ ε∂
∂
                                                (20)  
* *( , , , , ) = 0h t x u vς ε                                                                                  (21) 
* *( , , , , ) = 0jh t x u vη ε                                                                                   (22)  
* *( , , , , ) 0h t x u v ε ≥                                                                                        (23)  
0ς ≥                                                                                                            (24)   
0 , = 1,2, , .j j Nη ≤                                                                                 (25)  
 where  
1
=1





H t x u v w w p w I t x u v p f t x u vς η γ ε γ ε+∑  
( , , , , )T h t x u vς ε−                                                                                         (26)  
 is the Hamiltonian function of the players inside the coalition and its partial 
derivatives evaluated using the two sets of multipliers ς  and jη  . 
              For the players outside the coalition , If ( , ) su v R∈Ω⊆  is Nash 
equilibrium point for the N  players corresponding to problem 3( , )P γ ε  , 
then there exist continuous costate functions 0:[ , ]
j n
fq t t R→  , 
j qRδ ∈ such 
that the following relations are satisfied  
* * *
0 0( ) = ( , , , , ), ( ) =x t f t x u v x t xε                                                                (27)  














                                                             (28)  
*( ( ))










                                    (29)  
*( , , , , , , , )










                                          (30)  
*( , , , , ) = 0, = 1,2, ,jh t x u v j Nδ ε                                                          (31)  
*( , , , , ) 0h t x u v ε ≥                                                                                      (32)  
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0, = 1,2, ,j j Nδ ≥                                                                               (33)  
 where  
( , , , , , , , ) = ( , , , , ) ( , , , , )j j jTj jH t x u v q I t x u v q f t x u vδ γ ε γ ε+  
( , , , , ), = 1,2, ,jT h t x u v j Nδ ε−                                                            (34)  
 are the Hamiltonian functions of each of the N  players and its partial 
derivatives.Furthermore ,if * ˆ( , )j su v D R∈ ⊆ Ω⊆  is a Min-Max point for 
player j  of the Nash players corresponding to problem 4 ( , )P γ ε  , then there 
exist continuous costate functions 0:[ , ]
j n
fq t t R→ ,
j qRς ∈  and j qRη ∈  
such that the following relations are satisfied  
 * * * * 0 0( ) = ( , , , , ), ( ) =
jx t f t x u v x t xε                                   (35)  
 
* *( , , , , , , , , )
( ) =
( )




H t x u v q
q t
x t
ς η γ ε∂
−
∂
                         (36)  
*( ( ))














( , , , , , , , , ) ˆ= 0, = 1,2, , ., = 1,2, ,
j j j j
j
j
H t x u v q
j N j N
v
ς η γ ε∂
∂
        (38)  
 
* *( , , , , , , , , )
= 0, = 1,2, ,
j j j j
jH t x u v q j N
u
ς η γ ε∂
∂
         (39)  
ˆ * * ˆ( , , , , ) = 0, = 1,2, , = 1,2, ,j jh t x u v j N j Nς ε                                (40)  
 * *( , , , , ) = 0, = 1,2, ,j jh t x u v j Nη ε                                   (41)  
 * *( , , , , ) 0jh t x u v ε ≥                                                            (42)  
                 0, = 1,2, ,j j Nς ≥                                        (43)  
                0, = 1,2, ,j j Nη ≤                                         (44)  
 where  
( , , , , , , , , ) = ( , , , , ) ( , , , , )j j j jTj jH t x u v q I t x u v q f t x u vς η γ ε γ ε+  
 ( , , , , ), = 1,2, ,jT h t x u v j Nς ε−                                       (45)  
 are the Hamiltonian functions of the Nash players and its partial derivatives 
evaluated using the two sets of multipliers jς  and jη  . 
 
Determination of The Stability Set of The First Kind 
               In this section we introduce method to determining the stability set 
of first kind *( )S U  for Pareto,Nash Min-Max continuous differential game 
that can be summarized in the following steps:   
1. Start with * *( , ) Bγ ε ∈  corresponding to Pareto,Nash Min-Max solutions 
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*U  
2. Substituting in the system of equations given by theorem (2) we obtain  
 
  ** *
=1 =1 =1











∂ ∂ ∂∑ ∑ ∑  
*( , , , , ) = 0h t x u vδ ε  
* ** * * *
=1 =1 =1











∂ ∂ ∂∑ ∑ ∑  
 
* ** * * *
=1 =1 =1











∂ ∂ ∂∑ ∑ ∑  
* *( , , , , ) = 0h t x u vς ε  
* *( , , , , ) = 0 , = 1,2, , .jh t x u v j Nη ε   
* * *
=1 =1
( , , , , ) ( , , , , ) ( , , , , ) = 0
qn
j j ji r
i r
i rj j j






∂ ∂ ∂∑ ∑
  
 
*( , , , , ) = 0 = 1,2, , .jh t x u v j Nδ ε   
 
* * * * * *
ˆ ˆ ˆ
=1 =1ˆ ˆ ˆ
( , , , , ) ( , , , , ) ( , , , , ) = 0
j j jqn
j j ji r
i r
i rj j j






∂ ∂ ∂∑ ∑  
 ˆ * * ˆ( , , , , ) = 0 , = 1,2, , ., = 1,2, , .j jh t x u v j N j Nς ε    
* * * * * *
=1 =1
( , , , , ) ( , , , , ) ( , , , , ) = 0
j j jqn
j j ji r
i r
i r






∂ ∂ ∂∑ ∑  
* *( , , , , ) = 0 , = 1,2, , .j jh t x u v j Nη ε                                                 (46) 
                 This system of equations (46) denoted by 
( , , , , , , , , )j j j jF w δ ς η δ ς η γ ε  , represent = 2 ( ) 2 (3 )s s N m l q N q N+ + + + +  
equations of the 2 (1 2 )M k k q N′+ + + +  unknowns, which are nonlinear in 
kRγ ∈  , kRε ′∈  and linear in , , , , ,j j jw δ ς η δ ς  and ( )j qRη ∈ . If 
= 2 (1 2 )s M k k q N′+ + + +  then we may obtain the unknowns explicitly.If 
=s k k′+  and ( , , , , , , , , )j j j jF wγ δ ς η δ ς η γ ε∇  , ( , , , , , , , , )j j j jF wε δ ς η δ ς η γ ε∇  
exist and continuous for every 
* * * * * * * * *( , , , , , , , , ) ( , , , , , , , , )j j j j j j j jw D wαδ ς η δ ς η γ ε δ ς η δ ς η γ ε∈  , where Dα  is the 
neighborhood of the point of solution * * * * * * * * *( , , , , , , , , )j j j jw δ ς η δ ς η γ ε  of 
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the system F  , then by the implicit function theorem ,γ  and ε  can be 
expressed as function of , , , , , ,j j j jw δ ς η δ ς η .  
 
The Stability Set of The Second Kind 
          Definition 1.5  Suppose that * *( , ) Bγ ε ∈  with a corresponding set *U  
of Pareto,Nash Min-Max solutions  *( , ), ( , ), ( , )u v u v u v  and *( , )ju v  of 
problems * * * *1 2( , ), ( , )P Pγ ε γ ε  , * *3 ( , )P γ ε  and * *4 ( , )P γ ε  respectively,and  
* * *
0 0( , , ) = {( , ) | ( ) = ( , , , , ), ( ) = ,
sI u v R x t f t x u v x t xσ γ ε ε∈   
* *( , , , , ) = 0, {1,2, , }, ( , , , , ) 0, }r rh t x u v r I q h t x u v r Iε ε∈ ⊂ ∉                (47)  
 which denote either the unique side of σ  or ( )int σ  which contains *U  ,then 
the stability set of second kind of problem ( , )P γ ε  corresponding to 
* *( , , )Iσ γ ε  denoted by * *( ( , , ))Q Iσ γ ε  is defined by  
{ }* * * * *( ( , , )) = ( , ) | ( , ) ( , , )Q I B Iσ γ ε γ ε γ ε σ γ ε φ∈ Ω ∩ ≠                     (48)  
 where  
* * * * *( , ) = {( , ) ( ) | ( , ) ( , ) }u v u v solve P for some w Wγ ε ε γ εΩ ∈Ω ∈    (49) 
           Lemma 1.6  If for each = 1,2, , .i M  the cost function ( , , , )iJ t u v γ  is 
strictly convex with respect to 
li
iu R∈  and concave with respect to 
mv R∈
,and for each = 1,2, , .j N  the cost function ( , , , )jJ t u v γ  is strictly convex 
with respect to mijv R∈  and concave with respect to 
lu R∈  and let 
1 1 1( , , )Iσ γ ε  , 2 2 2( , , )Iσ γ ε  are two distinct sides of ( )εΩ , then  
1 1 1 2 2 2( ( , , )) ( ( , , )) =Q I Q Iσ γ ε σ γ ε φ∩  
Proof. Consider that * * 1 1 1 2 2 2( , ) ( ( , , )) ( ( , , ))Q I Q Iγ ε σ γ ε σ γ ε∈ ∩  , then we 
have  
* * *
1 1 1( , ) ( , , )Iγ ε σ γ ε φΩ ∩ ≠ , 
* * *
2 2 2( , ) ( , , )Iγ ε σ γ ε φΩ ∩ ≠  
 which contradict that 1 1 1( , , )Iσ γ ε  , 2 2 2( , , )Iσ γ ε  are two distinct sides.  
 
Determination of the Stability Set of the Second Kind 
            To determine the stability set of second kind ( ( , , ))Q Iσ γ ε  for 
Pareto,Nash Min-Max continuous differential game that can be summarized 
in the following steps:   
1.  Start with * *( , ) Bγ ε ∈  corresponding to Pareto,Nash Min-Max 
solutions *U  for problem ( , )P γ ε .  
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2. Determining the side ( , , )Iσ γ ε  by substituting in the constraints to 
obtain the active set of constraints.  
3. From the definition of the stability Set of The Second Kind by taking 
= {1,2, , } {1,2, , }I d q⊂   then we have the system of equations: 
  ** *
=1 =1 =1











∂ ∂ ∂∑ ∑ ∑  
*( , , , , ) = 0 = 1,2, , .rh t x u v r dε   
* ** * * *
=1 =1 =1











∂ ∂ ∂∑ ∑ ∑  
* ** * * *
=1 =1 =1











∂ ∂ ∂∑ ∑ ∑  
* *( , , , , ) = 0 = 1,2, , .rh t x u v r dε   
* * *
=1 =1
( , , , , ) ( , , , , ) ( , , , , ) = 0
n d
j j ji r
i r
i rj j j






∂ ∂ ∂∑ ∑
  
 
*( , , , , ) = 0 = 1,2, , .rh t x u v r dε   
* * * * * *
ˆ ˆ ˆ
=1 =1ˆ ˆ ˆ
( , , , , ) ( , , , , ) ( , , , , ) = 0
j j jn d
j j ji r
i r
i rj j j






∂ ∂ ∂∑ ∑  
* * * * * *
=1 =1
( , , , , ) ( , , , , ) ( , , , , ) = 0
j j jn d
j j ji r
i r
i r






∂ ∂ ∂∑ ∑  
* *( , , , , ) = 0 = 1,2, , .jrh t x u v r dε   
(50) 
            This system of equations (50) represent 2 ( ) 3s N m l d d+ + + +  
equations of the 2 (1 2 )M k k d N s′+ + + + +  unknowns, which are nonlinear 
in kRγ ∈ , kRε ′∈ , lu R∈ , mv R∈  and linear in , , , , ,j j jw δ ς η δ ς  and 
( )j qRη ∈ , from which we can obtain γ  and ε  as function of 
, , , , , , ,j j j jw uδ ς η δ ς η  and v . 
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